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Abstract  
This article maps the emergence of inter-
sectional feminist theory and explores the 
difficulties translating this theory into a meth-
odology. To address these tensions, this arti-
cle proposes three axioms that centre on 
things the researcher must avoid when con-
ducting intersectional research and explores 
how these axioms can alleviate current ten-
sions within intersectional research. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article dresse le bilan de l’émergence de 
la théorie féministe inter-sectionnelle et ex-
plore les difficultés de traduire cette théorie 
en méthodologie. Afin d’adresser ces ten-
sions, cet article propose trois axiomes qui 
sont au cœur des choses que doit éviter tout 
chercheur/toute chercheuse qui entreprend 
des recherches inter-sectionnelles, et explore 
comment ces axiomes peuvent alléger les 
tensions actuelles au sein des recherches 
inter-sectionnelles. 
 
In her analysis of feminist politics and 
anti-racist political action, Kimberlé Crenshaw 
explains that the experiences of black women 
are often erased within both feminist and anti-
racist theory (1997). As a result, the double 
oppression experienced by black women 
remains undiscussed within both feminist and 
anti-racist theories and political organizations 
(1997). Crenshaw uses the example of vio-
lence against women to argue that relying on 
one identity category (such as gender) as the 
basis of analysis obscures the ways in which 
other identity markers (such as race) impact 
women’s experiences of violence. Crenshaw 
proposes a theory of intersectionality to ac-
count for this complexity, explaining that it 
accounts for the interplay of identities at the 
intersections of race, sex, class, sexual orien-
tation, or other characteristics (1997, 178).  
The concept of intersectionality is 
now widely used in feminist theory and re-
search to signal the notion that subjectivity is 
constituted by mutually reinforcing vectors of 
race, gender, class, and sexuality (Nash 
2008, 2). It also signals a shift away from an 
additive model of analysis that understands 
oppressions as independent strands of in-
equality and, rather, views these vectors of 
inequality as overlapping and interacting to 
form complex configurations of subjectivity 
(Choo and Ferree 2010, 131; Shields 2008). 
Intersectional theory has become an in-
creasingly popular theoretical approach within 
social research and is currently the primary 
analytic tool in both anti-racist and feminist 
theories (Nash 2008, 1). The question of who 
embodies an intersecting subject position is 
debated within identity politics (Nash 2008). 
For some theorists, intersectionality is a 
theory that applies to everyone, as all 
subjectivities are characterized by the inter-
play of race, sex, gender, class, and other 
identity markers. Other researchers hold that 
intersectionality is reserved for people who 
embody marginalized subject positions. In  
her analysis of intersectional theory, Nash 
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asserts that, “this unresolved theoretical dis-
pute makes it unclear whether intersection-
ality is a theory of marginalized subjectivity or 
a generalized theory of identity” (2008, 10). 
Despite these ongoing questions, intersec-
tional theory continues to be an important 
theoretical concept for much contemporary 
social analysis.  
Despite the popularity of intersection-
ality as a theoretical approach, researchers 
have not dedicated the same energy to dev-
eloping a methodology for intersectional re-
search (Shields 2008, 301; Nash 2008, 4). In 
fact, one area of research that theorists con-
sistently argue is underexplored is the devel-
opment of research designs and methods 
that can apply the tenets of intersectional 
theory to social research projects (Hancock 
2007, 74). The absence of a methodology of 
intersectionality can be attributed, in part, to 
the difficulty of constructing a research para-
digm that is attentive to “the complexity that 
arises when the subject of analysis expands 
to include multiple dimensions of social life 
and categories of analysis” (McCall 2005, 
1773). Due to a relative shortage of literature 
discussing intersectionality from a method-
logical perspective, researchers often have to 
learn how to conduct intersectional research 
through trial and error (Bowleg 2008, 313). 
Despite these difficulties, intersectionality 
continues to guide and enrich social re-
search. As a result, it is important to consider 
what a methodology of intersectionality might 
look like, and to ask how researchers can 
develop and use a methodology which would 
not only account for the intersections of vari-
ous identity markers such as race, class, and 
gender (Crenshaw 1997, 179), but also ac-
count for the fluidity of these identity markers.  
Developing a methodology for inter-
sectional research is complicated by the need 
to account for identity categories without 
relying on them too heavily to guide research. 
While researchers must approach identity 
categories carefully and critically, they must 
also interrogate the naturalization and hier-
archical structure of identities. In addition, an 
intersectional methodology is further compli-
cated because intersectionality as a theory 
illustrates that there are innumerable subject 
positions that can be studied, each marginal 
and marginalizing of others in a way that is 
continuously changing. Because there is no 
single way to approach vectors of oppression 
or to locate sites of power, it is impossible to 
develop a prescriptive methodology of inter-
sectionality that can account for how each 
individual experiences the interplay between 
race, class, sex, or other markers of power 
and oppression. Pinning down a single meth-
odology, and naming it specifically as the 
methodology of intersectionality, may render 
it (and thus the identity categories it purports 
to analyze) static. The development of a 
methodology of intersectionality would also 
be challenging because each academic disci-
pline that conducts intersectional research 
adheres to a specific research paradigm. 
What might constitute a successful method-
ology for one discipline might be inadequate 
for another. Consequently, a single frame-
work that dictates how researchers negotiate 
intersectional research is impossible, as the 
needs of each discipline (as well as the 
expectations of funding agencies) differ sig-
nificantly from one to the next.  
Rather than attempt to outline a 
methodology of intersectionality, I propose 
that an approach that focuses simultaneously 
on what a researcher does not do and on 
methodological problems that theorists have 
identified within intersectional research can 
both be used to address the complexity of 
intersecting identities. Consequently, I sug-
gest three axioms that can function as an 
outline of what researchers must avoid as 
they conduct intersectional research. While 
an axiom is commonly understood as some-
thing that is held to be true, an alternative 
definition suggests that an axiom is a state-
ment upon which an abstractly defined 
structure is based (OED). The axioms I 
propose function as the basis for inter-
sectional research, rather than work as given, 
incontestable truths. In this article, I briefly 
outline how intersectionality emerged within 
black feminist thought, as well as how this 
theory has evolved over time. I then explore 
current attempts to formulate a methodology 
for intersectional research and foreground 
some key methodological problems therein. 
In the final section of this paper, I outline a 
set of axioms that focus on research aims 
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themselves and I conclude by illustrating how 
these axioms can work to remedy some 
methodological problems that researchers 
must confront as they conduct intersectional 
analysis.  
 
The Rise of Intersectionality 
Although Kimberlé Crenshaw de-
veloped the term intersectionality in her land-
mark essay “Mapping the Margins: Inter-
sectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women” (1994), the notion that 
experiences are mediated by the interplay of 
race, class, and gender (among other factors) 
was widely discussed among women of 
colour before Crenshaw took up the pen. In 
1851, black abolitionist Sojourner Truth fam-
ously asked, “Ain’t I a Woman?” when she 
spoke publicly about her experiences as a 
slave and discussed how the abuse she 
endured on plantations was informed by both 
her race and her sex. More than a century 
later, black feminist thinkers such as 
Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins (1990/2000), 
Audre Lorde (1984), and bell hooks (1984) 
were deeply critical of the conspicuous 
absence of the experiences of black women 
within feminist theory. According to these 
prominent feminist thinkers, the experiences 
of black women are often ignored in both 
feminist and anti-racist discourses. These 
theorists attribute this exclusion in part to the 
widespread use of a theoretical approach that 
uses race or gender as independent axes of 
analysis rather than drawing from a frame-
work that could account for both (and other) 
axes of oppression (Davis 2008, 68). Rather 
than isolate one identity category and priv-
ilege it over other points of marginalization, 
intersectional theory sheds light on the ways 
various vectors of identity, such as race and 
gender, impact one another to form unique 
subjectivities and experiences. 
Intersectionality now complicates and 
enriches social science research and textual 
analysis within the humanities. Ange-Marie 
Hancock explains that, prior to the emer-
gence of intersectional theory, researchers 
tended to draw from a unitary approach that 
isolated one axis of oppression and used it to 
guide a research project. Within a unitary 
approach, one category is more important 
than all others, and researchers do not 
address the ways other axes of oppression 
might complicate this primary category (2007, 
68). A shortcoming of this paradigm is that it 
ignores the interconnectedness of identity 
categories and erases the ways in which indi-
viduals experience the intersections of axes 
of oppression. Hancock goes on to explain 
that, as researchers worked to remedy these 
problems, they began to rely on a “multiple 
approach,” which adds one axis of oppres-
sion onto another. While this new paradigm is 
a useful step in the process of trying to 
conduct research that accurately captures the 
experiences of subjugated groups, Hancock 
is critical of this technique as it locates iden-
tity categories as fixed and unchanging. Fur-
ther, this approach also assumes that the 
relationship between categories is predeter-
mined (2007, 70). Hancock argues that this 
model does not account for the experiences 
of individuals or groups who might fall in 
between unitary identity categories (2007, 
70).  
Researchers have also drawn on an 
additive approach, whereby social inequality 
increases with each additional layer of mar-
ginalization. In the additive model, one iden-
tity is added onto another, but this model fails 
to explore the impact that one identification 
has upon the next and ignores the notion that 
identities are in flux. Critics who reject this 
model maintain that it constructs people’s ex-
periences as separate, independent, and 
summative (Bowleg 2008, 314). Hancock 
argues that this model not only fails to ac-
count for the complexity of multiple oppres-
sions, but that it also pits one minority group 
against another as they compete for scarce 
resources or visibility, leaving undiscussed 
hegemonic assumptions that underpin social 
stratification (2007, 70). This model also 
tends to ignore that a person may experience 
oppression in one sphere but be empowered 
by the same social location in another context 
(Sedgwick 1990). It also ignores shifting sites 
of oppression as it paints groups as uniformly 
oppressed or enacting oppression upon 
others. Current intersectional theorists work 
to move away from this additive model in 
order to account for the interaction between 
axes of social subordination (Choo and 
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Ferree 2010, 131), and envision social loca-
tions as “more than the sum of mutually 
exclusive parts: they create an interlocking 
prison from which there is little escape” 
(Hancock 2007, 65). Intersectional research 
works to disrupt the assumption that identities 
are fixed and unchanging (Nash 2008, 6) and 
explores identities as they shift and change. 
Researchers continue to move away 
from this additive model and currently grapple 
with various approaches that could account 
for the immense complexity of conducting 
intersectional research. In her seminal article, 
“The Complexity of Intersectionality,” Leslie 
McCall engages with three approaches re-
searchers have used as they work to account 
for intersectional identities in their work. 
McCall identifies “anticategorical complexity” 
as an approach where researchers view 
identity categories as too restrictive to proper-
ly capture individual experiences. Research-
ers thus deconstruct these categories within 
the research process. For McCall, this ap-
proach “appears to have been the most 
successful in satisfying the demand for 
complexity, judging by the fact that there is 
now great skepticism about the possibility of 
using categories in anything but a simplistic 
way” (2005, 1773). McCall goes on to outline 
“intercategorical complexity” (or categorical 
complexity), which requires that “scholars 
provisionally adopt existing analytical cat-
egories to document relationships of inequal-
ity among social groups and changing con-
figurations of inequality along multiple and 
conflicting dimensions” (2005, 1773). Adher-
ents to this approach use identity categories 
critically as they locate people’s experiences 
within the parameters of these classifications. 
It is important to note that, while this ap-
proach relies on identity categories to make 
sense of varying social locations, it is also 
underpinned by an understanding that social 
positions and identity categories are con-
tinuously in flux (Nash 2008, 5). Finally, re-
searchers using what McCall names an 
“intracategorical framework” interrogate the 
boundaries of discursive categories and use 
these categories strategically. Within the 
intracategorical approach, researchers focus 
on a specific group of people at a given point 
in time at previously undiscussed points of 
intersectionality (2005, 1774). Nash maintains 
that, within this framework, researchers must 
“attend to the dangers of categorization yet 
do not necessarily reject the categories them-
selves” (2008, 5). This approach emphasizes 
“giving voice” to those who are in positions of 
oppression and is similar to Hancock’s “mul-
tiple intersections” approach (Choo and Fer-
ree 2010, 132), where the focus centres on 
differences in experience among members 
who make claims to similar identities (2010, 
133). Yet despite the utility of these three ap-
proaches, ongoing methodological obstacles 
continue to arise within the parameters of 
intersectional research.  
 
Methodological Complexity 
Many of the methodological problems 
within intersectional research projects stem 
from the dissonance between intersectionality 
as a theory and the applicability of these 
theories in research methods. While theorists 
have widely critiqued additive models, it is 
tremendously difficult to account for this cri-
tique when using research methods such as 
focus groups, interviews, and quantitative 
methods. For example, Bowleg explains that, 
despite efforts to the contrary, conversations 
between research participants and research-
ers are often guided by questions that are 
implicitly additive. Bowleg explains that what 
is “at issue is how to ask questions about ex-
periences that are intersecting, interdepend-
ent, and mutually constitutive, without resort-
ing, even inadvertently, to an additive 
approach” (2008, 314). While intersectional 
theorists are vocal opponents of additive 
models, the question of how to translate this 
critique into improved research methods is 
unresolved. Another methodological difficulty 
centres on how to approach identity cat-
egories themselves. All social categories can 
be fractured into even smaller groupings, 
resulting in a paralysis of sorts as axes of 
analysis multiply (Hancock 2007, 66). While 
identity categories are central to intersec-
tional theory and methodologies, the creation 
and multiplication of categories makes it tre-
mendously difficult to outline a research pro-
ject that can account for this complexity. It is 
also possible that using social categories as 
the primary vector of analysis might nat-
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uralize these categories, leaving the logic of 
domination that informs them unaddressed 
(Sedgwick 1990, 24). At the same time, de-
constructing these categories as discursive 
constructs may further oppress already mar-
ginalized groups, as identities often function 
as the basis upon which political alliances are 
formed and the grounds upon which social 
gains are won (Gamson 1995, 402).  
While this is not an exhaustive list of 
criticisms of intersectional research or poten-
tial obstacles therein, the challenges I have 
outlined could be partially addressed through 
a set of three research axioms that I discuss 
below: a researcher must not police the par-
ameters of intersecting identities; identity 
categories are not fixed; and researchers 
must not violate the vulnerability of others. It 
is important to note that I am not claiming to 
have solved these research problems through 
these axioms, nor am I suggesting that ad-
dressing these challenges will not generate a 
new host of difficulties. Rather, my intent in 
this section is to propose some news ways of 
approaching identity categories and research 
methods, in an attempt to account for the 
complexity of intersectional theory.  
 
Axiom 1: A Researcher Must Not Police 
the Parameters of Intersecting Identities 
The aforementioned debate over who 
can make a claim to an intersectional identity 
is indicative of a wider social trend of the 
policing of identity categories. The now in-
famous examples of the womyn-born-womyn 
policies of the Michigan Womyn’s Music 
Festival and women-only hiring policies of the 
Vancouver Rape Relief Society indicate that 
making a claim to a subjugated identity is a 
contentious political process. This has played 
out in a Canadian context in the recent deci-
sion in Kimberly Nixon v. Vancouver Rape 
Relief Society, in which the BC Court of 
Appeals upheld Vancouver Rape Relief’s 
opposition to giving Nixon, a male-to-female 
transsexual, the opportunity to volunteer in 
this women-only environment (Chambers 
2007). This decision, as well as ongoing de-
bates over who can make a claim to an 
intersectional identity, reminds us that sub-
jectivities are the grounds upon which con-
tentious debates about identities are waged 
and civil liberties are won and lost. This 
dispute causes particular tension among fem-
inist researchers, as the policing of identity 
categories undermines tenets of feminist so-
cial action that call for the importance of self-
identification.  
Although researchers can (and 
should) allow subjects to identify their own 
identity positions, the questions that a re-
searcher chooses to ask within the param-
eters of interviews or focus groups can un-
wittingly exacerbate this tension, as it is 
impossible to account for all possible pos-
itions within the interview process. If a re-
searcher poses questions that obscure one 
facet of a person’s identity, the researcher 
infers that one identity category is more im-
portant than another. For example, asking 
questions specifically related to living in 
poverty might ignore how a subject’s tenuous 
financial situation is informed by their race or 
gender. By privileging one identity over an-
other, researchers are determining for their 
participants which facets of their identity are 
the most important. In this case, where sub-
jects might view themselves as members of 
multiple diverse identity groups, the re-
searcher has isolated poverty as the axis of 
analysis and is implicitly constructing the 
subjects’ identity for them.  
Researchers must allow individuals to 
self-identify as intersectional and locate their 
own subject position within (and in between) 
discursive categories. However, this is ex-
tremely difficult because researchers must 
also define their research project from the 
outset, and part of this process is identifying 
with whom they will conduct research. Fur-
ther, it is impossible to account for all pos-
sible intersections, and, given time con-
straints and funding limitations, researchers 
cannot pose unending questions. In light of 
these complications, the axiom of refusing to 
police the parameters of intersecting iden-
tities can be translated into asking intersec-
tional questions that allow research subjects 
to self-identify and discuss which facets of 
their identity are most important within the 
parameters of the research project. Bowleg 
explains that in asking intersectional ques-
tions, a researcher can “invite the interviewee 
to discuss her identities and experiences 
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however they best resonate with her” (Bowleg 
2008, 315). Bowleg urges researchers to ask 
questions well; that is, asking interviewees 
about identities as they resonate with them, 
and adding intersections that the researcher 
may have overlooked (Bowleg 2008, 315). In 
this sense, individuals will be able to locate 
themselves within a demographic group as 
they answer questions and explain what this 
group means to them. Further, they will be 
able to speak to other markers of identity in 
relation to their lived experiences. On a prac-
tical level, open-ended research questions 
might need to be adjusted slightly, so that a 
question such as “Tell me about your experi-
ences dealing with racism” could become 
“Tell me about experiences where you felt 
marginalized or oppressed.”  
 
Axiom 2: Identity Categories Are Not Fixed 
While it might seem obvious to re-
searchers that identity categories are con-
tinuously in flux, what is less evident is how to 
approach these categories knowing that they 
will inevitably change, or that individuals 
might deploy identities strategically. Accor-
ding to Nash, “if intersectionality theory pur-
ports to provide a general theory of identity, it 
must grapple with whether intersectionality 
actually captures the ways in which subjects 
experience subjectivity or strategically deploy 
identity” (2008, 11). Following Crenshaw, it is 
also important to note that many feminist 
projects rendered black woman invisible or 
marginalized when they mobilized the cat-
egory “woman” in hegemonic terms (1997). 
However, deconstructing points of marginaliz-
ation, such as the identity “woman,” risks 
dismissing lived experiences of oppression as 
discursive constructs. Eve Kosofsky Sedg-
wick cautions against the desire to decon-
struct markers of identity and explains that 
this fixation on deconstruction “has both so 
fetishised the idea of difference and so 
vaporized its possible embodiment” (1990, 
23) that, as a result, we have “no theoretical 
room to deal” (1990, 24). Derrida’s notion of 
différance foregrounds how we can draw from 
social categories to understand lived experi-
ences of marginalization, while also problem-
atizing their hegemonic usages. Derrida ex-
plains that différance is a “strategy without 
finality” (1982, 5), and notes that “différance 
is not an opposition, not even a dialectical 
opposition; it is a reaffirmation of the same, 
an economy of the same in relation to the 
other, which does not require that the same, 
in order to exist, be frozen or fixed in a 
distinction or in a system of dual oppositions” 
(1982, 21). For Derrida, différance does not 
measure differences empirically, nor does it 
rely on binaries or hierarchies to distinguish 
one thing from the next. Rather, différance is 
a continuous chain of becoming, with each 
segment connected to, but differing from, the 
next (Roudinesco 2004, 21). Derrida is care-
ful to note that différance is not a word, nor is 
it a concept (Derrida 1982, 4), but rather it 
indicates a process of differentiation beyond 
previously held limits (Roudinesco 2004, 21).  
Within a methodology of intersection-
ality, researchers can understand identity cat-
egories in light of différance; that is, identities 
are not heterogeneous, but rather they form a 
chain of meanings that cannot be pinned 
down. As a result, discursive categories and 
subject positions are made historically spe-
cific, and, while each meaning is linked to 
other understandings of a discursive location, 
these meanings and subjectivities are not 
fixed, nor are they necessarily consistent. 
Understood within différance, the researcher 
and subjects collaborate to outline the speci-
ficities of one or many identity markers that 
will be the basis of analysis. Further, these 
specificities must be renegotiated and re-
defined as the research progresses in order 
to account for identities that are also continu-
ously changing. Bowleg argues that research-
ers must make explicit both the intersections 
between ethnicity, sex/gender, and sexual 
orientation (to name just a few), as well as 
the social inequalities related to these 
identities (2008, 322). Understanding identity 
categories through the concept of différance 
can help researchers make sense of this 
complexity and account for the centrality of 
social categories while also using them crit-
ically. Within différance, what it might mean 
for one person to have gendered experiences 
does not necessarily mean that these experi-
ences are universal or even consistent with 
those of others. As a result, this axiom will 
allow researchers and participants to deploy 
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identity categories, but also understand them 
as fluctuating entities.  
 
Axiom 3: Researchers Must Not Violate 
the Vulnerability of Others 
It is impossible to enumerate the po-
tential subject positions located at the inter-
sections of identity categories. Further, the 
process of trying to enumerate intersecting 
identities in order to determine who is the 
most severely marginalized not only poten-
tially naturalizes points of oppression them-
selves, but also takes for granted hegemonic 
ideologies that inform social stratification. 
Further, while the goal of “giving voice” can 
foreground subjugated knowledges that might 
inform policy changes or social reform, 
“giving voice” can also give rise to paternal-
istic research practices that allow individuals 
to ignore their own role in the marginalization 
of others. Sherene Razack and Marie Louise 
Fellows write that moments of political conflict 
and stagnancy often arise when women view 
themselves as unimplicated in the oppression 
of others. As Razack and Fellows state, 
“When we view ourselves as innocent, we 
cannot confront the hierarchies that operate 
among us” (1998, 335). In order to fore-
ground how the freedom of one group is con-
tingent on the oppression of another, while 
avoiding the naturalization of axes of op-
pression, researchers can conceptualize all 
subject positions as needing attention, con-
cern, and care.  
Debra Bergoffen suggests that 
humans are connected to one another in a 
way that renders each person dependent 
upon others (2003, 121). Bergoffen goes on 
to explain that “as long as the values of 
integrity, independence, sovereignty and free-
dom are understood as expressions of an 
autonomous subject, the law of domination 
will prevail and patriarchy will endure” (2003, 
128). Bergoffen argues that conceptualizing 
all bodies (not just female bodies) as vul-
nerable can disrupt the dualism between 
oppressed and oppressor, and while each 
person is vulnerable, this vulnerability is cul-
turally, socially, and historically specific 
(2003, 121). Bergoffen calls this paradigm a 
heteronomy of vulnerability, whereby each 
individual is connected to others, and each 
person must respect, and thus not violate, the 
other’s vulnerability. For Bergoffen, then, 
“heteronomy is the secret of humanity. Here 
we discover that our humanness consists in 
the fact that we are neither autonomous nor 
homogenous—that there is justice in the 
heteronomy of our mutual vulnerability” 
(2003, 133). Within the context of inter-
sectionality, rather than search for the most 
oppressed identity and use this as the point 
of departure for study, and in place of 
attempting to understand who oppressed 
whom as a means to identify and challenge 
racist, sexist, or homophobic practices, each 
person must be understood as vulnerable—
and this vulnerability must inform the 
research process. Further, if each person is 
vulnerable, then research will explore the 
specificity of this vulnerability (be it along the 
intersections of race, class, or other identity 
markers) while respecting, and thus not ex-
ploiting, the vulnerability of others. Through 
this framework, each subject is located in an 
interlocking network of oppressions and em-
powerments that render them both vulnerable 
and capable of exploiting the vulnerability of 
others. Similarly, the researcher must ac-
count for the vulnerability of their subjects 
and their methodology must not exploit that 
vulnerability. 
In Frames of War (2009), Judith But-
ler explores the logic that enables some lives 
to flourish and benefit from state protection at 
the expense of others. Butler is deeply op-
posed to this logic and proposes that all lives 
are precarious; that is, the life of one person 
depends upon the lives of others for survival 
(2009, 25). Butler’s analysis of precarious 
lives is similar to Bergoffen’s discussion of 
vulnerability; both theorists see all bodies as 
connected to one another and dependent on 
each other for survival. While Butler argues 
that all lives are precarious, she is also care-
ful to explain that some lives are more precar-
ious than others. When a person does not 
have access to food, shelter, political alli-
ances, and protections that make life livable, 
they are at greater risk of suffering and 
abuse. Further, subjugated groups are in-
creasingly vulnerable when they are subject 
to brutality and state violence, as well as to 
colonial and imperial legacies (2009, 29). In 
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this example, Butler points towards the notion 
that, while all lives are precarious, some are 
significantly more vulnerable to abuse and 
suffering than others. Following Butler and 
Bergoffen, and within the parameters of 
intersectional research projects, researchers 
can conceive of all subjects as specifically, 
but not equally, vulnerable, and must account 
for this vulnerability in the research process.  
Choo and Ferree argue that a meth-
odological strategy for intersectional research 
must consider how to denaturalize hegem-
onic norms and champion more dynamic an-
alyses that “consider how national and trans-
national structures of inequality are produced 
and reproduced in multiple processes such 
as gendering, racialization, labor exploitation, 
and generational succession” (2010, 147). 
For Choo and Ferree, researchers can make 
these improvements by bringing a more dy-
namic, process-oriented, non-hegemonic in-
tersectional analysis into play (2010, 147). A 
focus on vulnerability not only accounts for 
the social processes that give rise to abuse, 
but this heteronomy also foregrounds imbal-
ances in power that create subjugated groups 
from the outset, without pursuing the impos-
sible project of identifying each social loca-
tion. Finally, following Razack and Fellows 
(1998), by underscoring social factors such 
as the unequal distribution of wealth, state 
violence, racism, and colonialism (among 
others), feminist researchers will also be able 
to account for their own position of privilege 
within social hierarchies. 
  
Conclusion 
While I have outlined three axioms to 
guide a methodology of intersectionality, I do 
not intend for this list to be exhaustive. My 
aim, rather, is to provide an outline of criteria 
to consider when conducting research with 
intersectional subjects. Further, my goal is to 
provide guidelines to conduct research that 
has liberatory results and to provide spaces 
for self-identified intersectional subjects to 
make political allies and evaluate their chan-
ging identities. Like all tools in the social re-
search processes, and like identity categories 
themselves, these axioms must also con-
tinually be re-evaluated and critiqued by re-
searchers. It is important to note that imple-
menting these axioms also raises specific 
concerns. Where will future researchers learn 
the skill of accounting for vulnerability? Will 
funding bodies be amenable to axioms that 
will complicate and lengthen the research 
process? Due to the erosion of existing social 
safety nets and the growing popularity of neo-
liberal ideologies and policies, the marginal-
ization felt by subjugated groups continues to 
grow. It is thus crucial for researchers to 
continue to refine their methodological ap-
proaches in order both to disrupt paternalistic 
notions of “giving voice” and to collaborate 
with subjugated groups in ensuring that 
voices from the margins are heard on their 
own terms.  
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